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This paper tests for the importance of cash flow on investment in fixed capital and R&D using firm-level panel 
data in two countries between 1985 and 1994.  For German firms, cash flow is not informative in simple 
econometric models of fixed investment or R&D.  In identical specifications for British firms, cash flow is 
informative about investment, although not about the level of R&D spending conditional on the R&D 
participation decision.  In the UK, we also find that investment is less sensitive to cash flow for R&D-
performing firms, and that cash flow predicts whether firms perform R&D or not.  We confirm that these 
differences do not simply reflect a greater role for current cash flow in forecasting future sales.  These results 
suggest that financial constraints are more significant in Britain, that they affect the decision to engage in R&D 
rather than the level of R&D spending by participants, and that consequently the British firms that do engage in 
R&D are a self-selected group where financing constraints tend to be less binding. 
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Are ﬁnancial constraints a signiﬁcant determinant of company investment activities?
Numerous papers have addressed this question in the last decade.1 This paper is novel
in two principal respects. First, we investigate whether the impact of ﬁnancial variables
diﬀer between ﬁrms in Britain and Germany. Second, we investigate whether the im-
pact of ﬁnancial variables diﬀer between investment in ﬁxed capital and investment in
research and development (R&D).2 Alfred Marshall (1919, p.347) was neither the ﬁrst,
nor last, to draw critical comparisons between the system of ﬁnance for innovation in
Britain relative to that in Germany. Despite this interest there have been no systematic
attempts to exploit ﬁrm level information on R&D investment and cash ﬂow to identify
any diﬀerences in the importance of liquidity constraints across the two nations.
Testing for ﬁnancial constraints is intrinsically diﬃcult. Financial variables such as
cash ﬂow contain information about expected future proﬁtability which may be relevant
for investment decisions even under the null hypothesis of perfect capital markets. Re-
cent econometric tests have relied on ﬁnding diﬀerential sensitivity to cash ﬂow between
sub-samples of ﬁrms that are thought to be diﬀerentially aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints
ap r i o r i ; and/or on structural econometric models which control for the inﬂuence of ex-
pected proﬁtability under particular, usually highly restrictive, assumptions. There are
at least two major problems with these methodologies. First, the allocation of ﬁrms
to ‘constrained’ and ‘unconstrained’ regimes is often based on outcomes which, at least
in part, are chosen endogenously by ﬁrms (e.g. dividend payments, employment size,
corporate structure). Second, as Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have forcefully noted,
even results based on structural models (e.g. Q models, Euler equations) have generally
1See Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998) for recent surveys.
2There have been a few previous studies investigating ﬁnancing constraints and R&D (see Hall (2002)
for a survey). Hall (1992), Himmelberg and Peterson (1994), Hao and Jaﬀe (1993)) focus on the US and
Harhoﬀ (1998) uses German data. Mulkay et al (2001) compare France and the US whilst Hall et al.
(1999) present comparative results for France, Japan and the US. Bhagat and Welch (1995) ﬁnd larger
cash ﬂow eﬀects on R&D for British and US ﬁrms than other G7 countries.
1found some sensitivity to cash ﬂow even for the sub-samples of supposedly ‘uncon-
strained’ ﬁrms. At the same time, recent evidence of lumpy and irreversible adjustment
has cast doubt on the speciﬁcation of most existing structural models.3
Companies in Britain and Germany operate under strikingly diﬀerent ﬁnancial sys-
tems. To the extent that ﬁnancial constraints on investment expenditures result from a
cost premium for external sources of ﬁnance, these national diﬀerences may be associated
with a diﬀerence in the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial constraints. This cost premium could
reﬂect asymmetric information and conﬂicts of interest between shareholders, managers
and suppliers of outside ﬁnance. Share ownership in Germany tends to be more con-
centrated than in Britain, which may mitigate asymmetric information and conﬂicts
of interest between shareholders and managers. Bank representation on supervisory
boards and long-term repeated relationships between banks and ﬁrms in Germany may
mitigate asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Large German ﬁrms
are more likely to remain unquoted, hostile takeovers are extremely rare, and dividend
payout ratios tend to be both lower and less rigid in German ﬁr m st h a ni nB r i t i s h
ﬁrms.4 Many economic historians have suggested that Britain’s ﬁnancial system may
be less conducive to long-term investment, and linked this to Britain’s relative economic
decline in the 20th Century.5 If these diﬀerences between national ﬁnancial systems are
truly exogenous and related to the impact of ﬁnancial constraints, this variation oﬀers
a potentially compelling source of identiﬁcation.
W h yl o o ka tR & Da sw e l la sﬁxed investment? There are good reasons to believe
that some types of investment are more likely to be subject to ﬁnancial constraints than
others. Investments in intangible assets tend to be both riskier and harder to collat-
eralize than investment in ﬁxed assets; they may therefore be more prone to ﬁnancing
3See Cabellero (1997) for a review.
4See Edwards and Fischer (1994) for evidence on share ownership, Franks and Mayer (1990) for
evidence on takeovers, and Correia da Silva (1996) for evidence on dividends.
5See Gerschenkron (1968) for a classical exposition or Hutton (1995) for a more recent re-statement
of this position.
2constraints. In addition, the very act of seeking outside support for an R&D project
could leak information to rivals and therefore reduce the prospective value of innovation.
The disappointing growth of aggregate R&D spending in Britain over the last twenty
years, compared to aggregate R&D spending in other OECD countries (see Section 2),
is often blamed on problems in ﬁnancing R&D investment.
A small literature has emerged which does suggest that company R&D spending
is sensitive to cash ﬂow, but the results are often weak. This is unsurprising. Two
key features of R&D investment are that establishing a R&D programme involves sig-
niﬁcant sunk costs, and large ﬂuctuations in the level of spending in existing research
programmes are very costly.6 Financial constraints, if they are signiﬁcant at all, may
manifest themselves more in the decision to set up R&D facilities, rather than in de-
cisions about the year to year levels of spending in existing research programmes. We
therefore consider the R&D ‘participation’ decision, as well as the level of R&D spend-
ing by those companies that do engage in R&D. We also consider the relationship
between ﬁxed investment and cash ﬂow separately for R&D performing and non-R&D
performing companies. In each case we believe that the contrast between British ﬁrms
and German ﬁrms is likely to be informative. For example, if the UK ﬁnancial system
makes it more expensive for ﬁrms to raise external ﬁnance for R&D investment, those
ﬁrms that do engage in R&D may consist predominately of ﬁrms who are conﬁdent that
they can ﬁnance their R&D commitments from internal sources.7 In this case ﬁnancial
constraints would tend not to be binding for these companies, so the ﬁxed investment
of R&D performing ﬁrms may display lower sensitivity to cash ﬂow than the ﬁxed in-
vestment of non-R&D performing ﬁrms in Britain. However if ﬁnancial constraints are
not signiﬁcant for German companies, we should ﬁnd no cash ﬂow sensitivity in the
6Around sixty percent of R&D spending goes on the wages of R&D personnel. These are generally
highly skilled workers, for whom there are large hiring, ﬁring and training costs.
7In other words, having ‘deep pockets’ may be an important consideration in the R&D participation
decision (Schumpeter, 1942).
3investment behaviour of either the R&D performing ﬁrms or the non-R&D performing
ﬁrms in Germany.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set the scene by examining
aggregate trends in ﬁxed investment and R&D in Britain and Germany, and we describe
the ﬁrm level datasets that we have compiled and used in our analysis. Section 3 outlines
some simple econometric models of ﬁx e di n v e s t m e n ta n dR & Dw h i c hw eu s ei nt h i s
comparison. Section 4 contains the main empirical results, where we ﬁrst examine ﬁxed
investment and R&D equations for R&D performing ﬁrms in both countries. We then
estimate ﬁxed investment equations for samples which pool together both R&D and
non-R&D performing ﬁrms and test whether there is a diﬀerential sensitivity to cash
ﬂow between R&D performers and non-R&D performers. Section 5 considers a series
of potential criticisms concerning the interpretation of the cash ﬂow variable, estimates
of the R&D participation decision, the production function, and measurement issues.
Section 6 oﬀers some concluding comments.
In short, our preferred speciﬁcations show sensitivity of ﬁxed investment to cash ﬂow
for British companies but not for German companies. The level of R&D spending by
R&D performers is not sensitive to cash ﬂow in either country. Within Britain there
is greater sensitivity of ﬁxed investment to cash ﬂow for non-R&D performing com-
panies than for R&D performing companies, and the R&D performing companies are
signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable. Within Germany, we do not ﬁnd these diﬀerences. These
ﬁndings are robust to a variety of alternative interpretations of the cash ﬂow measure.
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that British ﬁrms face signiﬁcant ﬁnan-
cial constraints, and suggests that the British ﬁnancial system may discourage some
companies from engaging in R&D.
42. Aggregate trends and company data sets
The company datasets for the two countries are obtained from diﬀerent sources. For
the UK the data is drawn from the Datastream on-line service which covers all com-
panies quoted on the UK stock market. R&D data is available for some companies
since the early 1970s, but for these companies R&D disclosure was completely volun-
tary. Changes to the accounting conventions governing R&D disclosure after 1985 mean
that a representative sample is only available in later years. For Germany changes in
disclosure requirements took eﬀect from 1987 and we use R&D information from the
Bundesanzeiger supplemented by other sources of accounting data to construct the
ﬁrm level dataset. This includes both quoted and unquoted AGs (stock companies)
and GmbHs (limited liability corporations), which is important in the German context
where a lot of large R&D performing ﬁrms are not quoted on the stock market.8 For
each country, we obtain two samples. The ﬁrst includes essentially all the large ﬁrms
who report R&D expenditures. The second sample also includes ﬁrms who did not
report R&D, and for which we were able to verify that they were not performing R&D
according to standard deﬁnitions. The Data Appendix has a full description of the
construction of both databases.
We attempt to use variables that are comparable across countries, even though the
national accounting deﬁnitions are not precisely the same. The main variables we use
are ﬂows of ﬁxed investment, R&D investment, sales, gross operating proﬁts, and cash
ﬂow. Investment spending is obtained from the sources and uses of funds account, and
not inferred from changes in the balance sheet. We use real sales as a proxy for output.
A measure of the stock of capital at current replacement cost was estimated from the
ﬂow data on investment using a standard perpetual inventory method, in a similar way
8Although we have two more years of data for the UK (1985 and 1986) than Germany there are
fewer British ﬁrms in the pre-1989 period. Thus the overall sample sizes are roughly the same across
the two countries which is an advantage when making inferences based on common signiﬁcance levels.
5for each sample (see Data Appendix for more details).
Before describing the ﬁrm level data in more detail, it is worthwhile looking at some
aggregate comparisons across time and between countries for R&D and ﬁxed invest-
ment.9 Table 1a contains information on total gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) as
a proportion of GDP for the UK and Germany since 1960. The top row shows clearly
that Germany invested more of its GDP throughout the period 1960-1993. The second
row excludes housing investment. This accounts for part of the diﬀerence between the
countries, although not all of it (cf. Cabinet Oﬃce, 1996). The ﬁnal row considers
only machinery and equipment investment and this again narrows the gap, although
Germany still invests more in the later period.
Table 1a: Fixed Investment as % of GDP
1960-93 1960-93 1960-79 1960-79 1980-93 1980-93
UK GER UK GER UK GER
Total GFCF 18.2 22.4 18.6 23.7 17.4 20.4
Total GFCF (exc. housing) 14.4 15.9 14.8 16.7 13.7 14.5
Machinery and Equipment 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.0 8.6
Source: OECD Historical Statistics (1995)
Table 1b: R&D as % of GDP
1973-93 1973-93 1973-79 1973-79 1980-93 1980-93
UK GER UK GER UK GER
BERD/GDP 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9
Source: OECD/DSTI ANBERD (1995)
9See Bond and Jenkinson (1996) and Van Reenen (1997) for a more detailed international comparison
across countries for investment and R&D respectively.
6Table 1c: Financing of BERD, 1989
UK GER EU OECD
Industry Own Financed 69.5 86.0 78.8 79.6
Overseas Financed 13.4 2.7 6.9 n/a
Government Financed 17.2 11.3 14.4 18.0
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (1996)
Table 1b attempts a similar kind of analysis for R&D conducted by the business
sector. The proportion of GDP devoted to business expenditure on R&D (BERD) is
higher in Germany than Britain, particularly in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. A ﬁnal
interesting fact is that domestic industry ﬁnances a much lower proportion of business
R&D spending in the UK than in Germany (see Table 1c). The government actually
ﬁnances a larger proportion of business enterprise R&D in the UK than in Germany
(notably in military R&D). It is clear then that domestic, privately funded business
R&D is considerably lower in Britain as a proportion of GDP than in Germany.
Turning now to the company data, Table 2 contains some simple descriptive statistics
for the sample of ﬁrms who reported R&D in 1992.10 On average the British and
German ﬁrms are of similar size (as measured by employment). Although the mean
a n dm e d i a nG e r m a nﬁrm is slightly larger, British ﬁrms are larger at the upper tail of
the distribution. These are typically large ﬁrms, even for ﬁrms quoted on the UK Stock
Exchange, a point that will be returned to in discussing the empirical results. In terms
of sales, the British ﬁrms are slightly larger at the mean, but German ﬁrms are larger
at the median. So in terms of size distribution, our two samples are reasonably well
matched.
Investment comparisons are also made in Table 2. These are more diﬃcult because
the investment ﬁgures in German company accounts do not include ﬁxed capital acquired
10We report descriptives for a single year w h e r ew eh a v eal a r g ec r o s ss e c t i o no fﬁr m si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
Very similar results are obtained for other years.
7through acquisitions of new subsidiary companies, whereas the British ﬁgures do. The
‘wide deﬁnition’ of UK investment (including acquisitions) suggests that British and
German ﬁr m sl o o kv e r ys i m i l a r ,e v e nt h a tU Kﬁrms invest slightly more of their sales
than their German counterparts at the mean. Excluding these acquisitions (the ‘narrow
deﬁnition’) reveals that at both the mean and the median UK ﬁrms invest slightly less
than German ﬁrms in direct purchases of ﬁxed capital. This appears broadly consistent
with the aggregate ﬁgures for machinery and equipment in Table 1a.11
Typically, researchers using R&D data have constructed a cash ﬂow measure that
adds back R&D expenditures to conventionally measured cash ﬂow, since most R&D
costs are expensed in company accounts (e.g. Hall 1992; Himmelberg and Peterson,
1994). In Table 2 the ratio of this cash ﬂow measure (i.e. gross of R&D) to the capital
stock appears similar across the two countries. This disguises the fact that German
ﬁrms have much higher R&D and somewhat lower cash ﬂow net of R&D costs than UK
ﬁrms. German corporations are much more R&D intensive than British companies. The
average German company in the sample invests about 6% of sales in R&D, compared
to 3% in the UK. The aggregate ﬁgures for this period are broadly consistent with this
‘R&D gap’12. This consistency between the OECD data and the company accounting
data is reassuring as although the accounting deﬁnitions of R&D in both countries are
based on the common Frascati manual deﬁnition, it may be that German accountants
take a wider deﬁnition of view of what constitutes R&D13. The ‘R&D gap’ between
11The narrow measure is more comparable to the aggregate ﬁgures, since one ﬁrm acquiring capital
from another does not raise aggregate investment. The wide measure is probably more suitable for
models of company investment, but this is not available for our German sample. In the empirical work
r e p o r t e db e l o ww eu s et h ew i d ed e ﬁnition of investment for the UK, where acquisitions are far more
important than in Germany. In fact our UK results were similar whichever measure was used (see
Section 5.5).
12Industrially funded business R&D intensities are only about 60% higher in Germany (combine
Tables 1b and 1c). The diﬀerence between the ﬁrm level and the aggregate ﬁgures arises mainly from
the fact that the ﬁrm level ﬁgures refer to all R&D regardless of where it was conducted, whereas the
aggregate ﬁgures are based on all R&D conducted within a territorial area.
13In the empirical speciﬁcations the inclusion of ﬁrm speciﬁce ﬀects should help mitigate this sort of
measurement error.
8Britain and Germany is not simply due to a diﬀerent industrial composition as Table
A1 in the Appendix shows that even within industries, British ﬁrms have lower R&D
intensities. Neither can it be explained by tax incentives, as R&D is treated in a very
similar manner for tax purposes in the two countries - essentially it can all be expensed
against corporate tax liabilities (see Bloom et al, 1998, for more details of the tax
treatment of R&D across countries).
Table 3 looks at the second sample we have constructed which includes non-R&D
performing ﬁrms. We focus here on industries with above median R&D intensity and
label these ‘high tech’ industries. Comparing R&D and non-R&D ﬁr m sa c r o s sa l ls e c t o r s
could be misleading because there is practically zero R&D in many industries. These
‘high tech’ sectors include some industries which are not typically thought of as being
very science-based (such as motor vehicles), but our samples are not large enough to
adopt a narrow classiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst striking thing about Table 3 is that R&D performing ﬁrms (“R&D>0”) tend
to be both larger and more proﬁtable (as reﬂected in cash ﬂo w )i nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .T h e
diﬀerence in proﬁtability is greater in Britain than Germany, however. The diﬀerence
in the cash ﬂow ratios (net of R&D costs) between R&D performers and non-R&D
performers is 0.091 (= 0.254 - 0.163) in the UK and 0.028 ( = 0.143 - 0.115) in Germany.
Obviously this diﬀerence would be even greater had we measured cash ﬂow gross of R&D
costs. It is also interesting to note that far more ﬁrms in our sample perform R&D in
Germany (83%) than in the UK (53%). This suggests that cash ﬂow may be important
in the decision to set up an R&D programme (the participation decision) as well as the
ongoing decision of how much to spend in existing R&D programmes.
As a ﬁnal piece of preliminary analysis we consider a simple ‘diﬀerence in diﬀer-
ences’ estimator. We are seeking to identify ﬁnancial constraints from the correlation of
diﬀerences in investment with diﬀerences in cash ﬂow (to remove ﬁxed eﬀects). Recog-
nizing that there may be a correlation for reasons unrelated to ﬁnancial constraints we
9are also using the diﬀerence in this correlation across diﬀerent countries. To illustrate
this we pooled the data across all ﬁrms in both countries in all years and ran a simple
model where the rate of investment in ﬁxed capital (It/Kt−1) was regressed against sales
growth (∆yt)a n dc a s hﬂow (C/Kt−1). The model is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences and
also includes a dummy for the UK and each time period. As expected, the results from
this model showed that sales growth and cash ﬂow are highly correlated with investment,
and that British ﬁrms had slower growth in investment over this time period.
∆(It/Kt−1)=−.016(.006)UK+ .256(.036)∆(Ct/Kt−1)+.053(.016)∆∆yt + time dummies
(t = 1987,..,1994;NT = 1687; robust standard errors ;OLS).
Of more interest, however, is the interaction term between cash ﬂow and the UK
dummy. This interaction term tests whether investment is more sensitive to cash ﬂow
in Britain than in Germany. Including this as an extra term generated the following
results:
∆(It/Kt−1)=−.009(.006)UK+ .137(.031)∆(Ct/Kt−1)+.388(.090)[UK∗ ∆(Ct/Kt−1)] +
.049(.016)∆∆yt + time dummies
Consistent with the view that British ﬁrms display more sensitivity to cash ﬂow, the
coeﬃcient on this interaction term is positive and highly signiﬁcant. This remains so
when we add further interaction terms between the UK dummy and sales growth, and
with the time dummies. On one level the paper is mainly concerned with probing the
robustness of this interaction eﬀect.
Despite the interest of these descriptives, one may have good reason to be sceptical
about drawing any straightforward conclusions about ﬁnancial constraints. We have
10done nothing here to control for a whole host of data and econometric problems. The
next section confronts these problems in a more explicit econometric framework.
11Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for R&D Performing ﬁrms
Mean s.d. Q25 Q50 Q75
Employment UK 16.134 38.551 0.645 2.142 10.153
(1000s) GER 16.538 47.823 0.800 2.422 7.570
Sales UK 1.361 4.314 0.038 0.122 0.659
(£m) GER 1.109 3.174 0.045 0.167 0.498
(I/Y)t − narrow UK 0.053 0.051 0.029 0.042 0.062
(I/Y)t − wide UK 0.064 0.063 0.031 0.046 0.075
GER 0.058 0.054 0.031 0.049 0.066
It/Kt−1 UK 0.137 0.113 0.070 0.105 0.162
GER 0.119 0.085 0.069 0.103 0.150
(R&Dt + Casht)/Kt−1 UK 0.319 0.256 0.154 0.230 0.426
GER 0.311 0.293 0.155 0.236 0.359
Casht/Kt−1 UK 0.222 0.181 0.110 0.173 0.281
GER 0.171 0.171 0.077 0.126 0.207
(R&D/Y)t UK 0.028 0.036 0.006 0.016 0.032
GER 0.060 0.065 0.023 0.045 0.074
NOTES:- These are taken for the sample of R&D performing ﬁrms in 1992 (175 UK ﬁrms and
201 German ﬁrms) .




Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
Employment 10.663 28.080 1.392 1.927 5.673 0.595
(1000s)
Sales 1.004 4.206 0.089 0.194 0.623 0.041
(£m)
(I/Y)t 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.130 0.311 0.037
It/Kt−1 0.145 0.124 0.112 0.142 0.148 0.098




Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
Employment 18.600 55.60 2.552 1.051 5.311 0.457
(1000s)
Sales 1.182 3.410 0.161 0.066 0.096 0.023
(£m)
(I/Y)t 0.058 0.037 0.052 0.072 0.051 0.064
It/Kt−1 0.123 0.080 0.108 0.139 0.087 0.128
Casht/Kt−1 0.143 0.120 0.114 0.115 0.099 0.122
Firms 202 42
NOTES:- These are taken for a sample of ﬁrms in 1992 in the high tech sectors of both
countries.
133. Models of investment and R&D
In this paper the econometric speciﬁcations for ﬁxed investment and R&D in the two
countries are treated symmetrically. Diﬀerent dynamics and costs of adjustment are
allowed for (the estimated parameters can be diﬀerent for British and German ﬁrms)
but the speciﬁcations are identical for both countries. We also use the same basic
framework to model both investment spending and R&D spending, although details of
the speciﬁcation diﬀer. This is primarily a matter of convenience. We want to compare
common speciﬁcations across countries, rather than search for the best speciﬁcation of
investment and R&D equations in each country. Nevertheless the approach has some
disadvantages, which are discussed in more detail below.
The basic framework we use is an error correction model, which speciﬁes a long-run
or ‘target’ level of the capital stock (or stock of accumulated R&D), but which allows
a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the adjustment dynamics to be estimated from the data. The
main advantage of these models is that they are not rejected out of hand by the data, and
the estimated models have reasonable long-run and short-run properties. This is in sharp
contrast to more structural models such as Q models and Euler equations, which are
often found to have the wrong signs on key explanatory variables or to imply implausibly
slow speeds of adjustment14. The main disadvantage of the error correction models is
that the estimated dynamics compound inﬂuences from both capital adjustment and
expectations-formation processes. Thus the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on cash
ﬂow cannot be interpreted directly as evidence of ﬁnancing constraints. We return to
this issue in Section 5, where we show that diﬀerences in the eﬀect of cash ﬂow between
Britain and Germany cannot simply be explained by current cash ﬂow being a better
predictor of future sales. Furthermore, the cash ﬂow eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of
14There is some debate over whether the Q model can be “rescued” by using tax changes to generate
instrumental variables for Q (see the survey by Hubbard, 1998, for example) or by deﬁning Q based on
analysts’ forecasts rather than stock prices (see Bond and Cummins, 2001).
14a measure of analysts’ forecasts (which proxy future demand expectations) in the R&D
participation equation.
3.1. An error correction model of investment
The error correction model we consider speciﬁes the long-run desired level of the capital
stock as a log-linear function of output and the user cost of capital. Letting kit denote
the (natural) log of the desired capital stock for ﬁrm i in period t, yit denote the log
of output and jit denote the log of the user cost of capital, we write the desired capital
stock as
kit = a + yit − σjit. (3.1)
In the absence of any adjustment costs or barriers to immediate adjustment, this would
be the optimal capital stock for a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm with a constant returns to
scale CES production function (cf. Cabellero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995)). This
formulation nests the possibility of a ﬁxed capital-output ratio (σ =0 ) and a Cobb-
Douglas production function (σ =1 ).15
In the presence of adjustment costs, for example, the actual capital stock will not
adjust immediately to this target level. Recognizing that the adjustment process may
be complex, we nest this expression for the long-run capital stock within a general
autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) dynamic regression model, and use a ‘general-to-
speciﬁc’ speciﬁcation search to let the data determine the relevant dynamics within our
samples. For example, an ADL(2,2) model has the form
kit = α0 + α1ki,t−1 + α2ki,t−2 + β0yit + β1yi,t−1 + β2yi,t−2
+γ0jit + γ1ji,t−1 + γ2ji,t−2 + εit (3.2)
15With σ =1 , equation (3.1) describes the optimum capital stock in the Cobb-Douglas case, whether
or not there are constant returns to scale. With this qualiﬁcation noted, we will nevertheless refer to a
long-run unit elasticity with respect to output as a test of constant returns to scale in what follows.
15where the long-run elasticity of capital with respect to output is given by (β0 + β1 +
β2)/(1 − α1 − α2).
It is convenient to re-parameterize the model in error correction form (cf. Bean,
1981), which separates out short-run and long-run eﬀects. The corresponding error
correction model has the form
∆kit = α0 +( α1 − 1)∆ki,t−1 + β0∆yit +( β0 + β1)∆yi,t−1 + γ0∆jit +( γ0 + γ1)∆ji,t−1
−(1 − α1 − α2)(k − y)i,t−2 +[ β0 + β1 + β2 − (1 − α1 − α2)]yi,t−2
+(γ0 + γ1 + γ2)ji,t−2 + εit. (3.3)
Notice that the term in the (second) lagged level of output tests the restriction that the
long-run elasticity of capital with respect to output is unity.
To implement this model using company panel data, we assume that variation in
the user cost of capital can be controlled for using additive year-speciﬁce ﬀects (µt)a n d
ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects (ηi). To investigate whether ﬁnancial variables have explanatory
power for investment, we include current and lagged terms in the ratio of cash ﬂow
to the beginning-of-period capital stock (Cit/Ki,t−1). Finally we use the approximation
∆kit ≈ Iit/Ki,t−1−δi,w h e r eδi is the (possibly ﬁrm-speciﬁc) depreciation rate, subsumed
into the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects (ηi). Thus we obtain a model for the investment





















+ ηi + εit. (3.4)
We require θ<0 to be consistent with ‘error correcting’ behaviour (i.e. a capital stock
above its desired level is associated with lower future investment), and φ =0to be
consistent with long-run constant returns to scale.
It is well known that signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the cash ﬂow variables in this type
16of model cannot be interpreted directly as evidence of ﬁnancial constraints.16 In the
presence of convex adjustment costs, for example, the current level of the capital stock
would depend not just on current output and prices, as in (3.1), but also on the inherited
level of the capital stock, and on expectations of future output and prices.17 To illustrate
t h ei m p l i c a t i o n sa ss i m p l ya sp o s s i b l e ,s uppose that the desired capital stock in the
absence of adjustment costs is proportional to output, and that the actual capital stock
in the presence of adjustment costs is given by
kit = αki,t−1 + βyit + γEt [yi,t+1]
where Et [yi,t+1] denotes the expected value of yi,t+1 given information in period t.
Clearly, if expectations of future output depend on ﬁnancial variables as well as past
output, then these ﬁnancial variables would be signiﬁcant in a reduced form model of
investment, even in the absence of ﬁnancing constraints. For example, if










then we obtain the reduced form model










which illustrates how these models compound inﬂuences from the structural adjustment
process (γ) and the expectations-formation process (the π coeﬃcients).
Whilst this is clearly the case for reduced form models, a similar problem will aﬀect
any structural models that are not correctly speciﬁed. Many studies have therefore
f o c u s s e do nd i ﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on ﬁnancial variables between diﬀerent sub-
samples of ﬁrms. For this reason we will emphasize diﬀerences in the results on the cash
16See, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). For more recent contributions ctiticising
the interpretation of cash ﬂow in investment equation see Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gomes (2001)
and Abel and Eberley (2002)
17See Nickell (1978), chapter 11, for example.
17ﬂow terms between British ﬁrms and German ﬁrms, and between R&D ﬁrms and non-
R&D ﬁrms in each country. However we will go one step beyond the common practice
in the literature by investigating whether diﬀerences in the cash ﬂow coeﬃcients in the
investment equations can be accounted for by diﬀerences in the ability of cash ﬂow to
predict future sales (i.e. by diﬀerences in the π coeﬃcients in VAR models of real sales).
3.2. An error correction model of R&D
Our basic approach to modelling R&D spending parallels our approach to modelling
investment spending, as outlined above. We view R&D spending as a ﬂow which is
adjusted to achieve some desired level of an underlying stock, in this case the stock of
accumulated R&D or ‘knowledge’. The knowledge stock (Git) is given conceptually by
Git =( 1−δR
i )Gi,t−1+Rit,w h e r eRit is the current level of R&D spending and δR
i is the
(possibly ﬁrm-speciﬁc) rate at which research capital depreciates. Parallel to equation
(3.3), this would suggest an error correction model for R&D of the form
∆git = αR
0 +( αR
1 − 1)∆gi,t−1 + βR
0 ∆yit +( βR
0 + βR
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where git is the log of the stock of accumulated R&D and jR
it i st h eu s e rc o s to fc a p i t a l
for R&D.
The main diﬀerence from the case of ﬁxed investment, however, is that whilst com-
pany accounts contain some information on the value of the ﬁxed capital stock, they
contain no information on the value of the R&D capital stock. This need not be a
serious problem if long time series were available on the R&D expenditure ﬂows, but for
both British and German companies the available series on R&D spending are generally
short. For this reason we rely on a steady state approximation to ‘measure’ the stock
of R&D capital, rather than tryingt oc o n s t r u c tad i r e c te s t i m a t e .


















where rit is the log of R&D expenditure (cf. Bean, 1981). If this steady state approxi-
mation is reasonable, we can replace git in equation (3.5) by the observed rit,p r o v i d e d
we allow for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept. In fact, our empirical speciﬁcation is more general
than this, and controls for some deviations of actual R&D spending from its steady state
level by the inclusion of year dummies and the autoregressive-distributed lag dynamics.
T h u so u re r r o rc o r r e c t i o nm o d e lf o rR & Dt a k e st h ef o r m :
∆rit = µR
t + ρR
1 ∆ri,t−1 + ωR
0 ∆yit + ωR
















A si st h ec a s eo fﬁxed investment, we require θR < 0 for error correcting adjustment,
and φR =0for constant returns to scale.
We prefer this speciﬁcation for R&D, but not for ﬁxed investment. This is partly
because of the availability of ﬁxed capital stock data, and partly because the steady state
approximation is less likely to be reasonable in the case of investment: the investment
series are typically less smooth than the R&D series. It should also be noted that we
compared this approach with one where we explicitly measured the stock of accumulated
R&D capital using perpetual inventory procedures. We found that the latter approach
did not yield sensible empirical results in the context of an error correction model.
3.3. Estimation
To estimate these dynamic regression models using panels containing many ﬁrms and
a small number of time periods, we use a system GMM estimator developed by Arel-
19lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator controls for the
presence of unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects and for the endogeneity of the current-dated
explanatory variables. The system GMM estimator uses equations in ﬁrst-diﬀerences,
from which the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects are eliminated by the transformation, and for which
endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided there
is no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms. This is tested
by examining tests for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals (see Arellano
and Bond, 1991). These diﬀerenced equations are combined with equations in levels, for
which the instruments used must be orthogonal to the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects. Obviously
the level of the dependent variable must be correlated with the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects, and
we want to allow for the levels of all the explanatory variables to be potentially corre-
lated with the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects, so this rules out using the levels of any variables as
instruments for the levels equations. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in
autoregressive-distributed lag models, ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the series can be uncorrelated
with the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects provided that the series have stationary means. We there-
fore experimented with lagged diﬀerences of the variables as instruments for the levels
equations.
The precise instruments that we use are reported in the notes to the tables below.
Essentially we use lags of all the ﬁrm level variables in the model. Instrument validity
was tested using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, and by Diﬀerence Sargan
comparisons to the GMM estimator which just uses the equations in ﬁrst-diﬀerences.
The system GMM estimators reported here generally produced more reasonable esti-
mates of the autoregressive dynamics than the basic ﬁrst-diﬀerenced estimators.18 This
is consistent with the analysis of Blundell and Bond (1998), who show that in autore-
gressive models with persistent series, the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced estimator can be subject to
serious ﬁnite sample biases as a result of weak instruments, and that these biases can
18This was assessed by comparison to alternative estimators such as Within Groups and OLS levels,
which are known to produce biased estimates of autoregressive parameters.
20be greatly reduced by the inclusion of the levels equations in the system estimator. We
report results for a one-step GMM estimator, with standard errors and test statistics
that are asymptotically robust to general heteroskedasticity19.
We believe the use of GMM system estimator goes a long way to deal with the
problem of ‘weak instruments’ highlighted in much recent empirical work. Although the
lack of ‘external’ instruments may be seen as a disadvantage, it is worth emphasizing that
a major source of identiﬁcation comes from the diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients
across the two countries.
4. Main Results
We begin by reporting the results of the investment equation in Table 4 and then discuss
the R&D equations in Table 5. Column (1) in Table 4 contains the empirical results
of estimating (3.4) for our sample of UK R&D performing companies. It should be
compared with column (4) which has an identically speciﬁed model for the German
R&D performing companies. For both countries we ﬁnd evidence for a correctly signed
error-correction term (the capital-output ratio) which is signiﬁcant at conventional lev-
els. There also appears to be some evidence that the speed of adjustment is faster
in Britain than in Germany. The output growth terms are positive and signiﬁcant in
both countries. Furthermore, the diagnostic tests appear satisfactory with no evidence
of second order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals or rejection of the
overidentifying restrictions in either country.
19Although a more eﬃcient two-step GMM estimator is available, the asymptotic standard errors for
the two-step estimator can be an unreliable guide for inference in ﬁnite samples. The system GMM
estimates that we report are computed using DPD98 for GAUSS (see Arellano and Bond, 1998).
21Table 4: Fixed Investment Models
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
I t/K t−1
UK Germany
I t−1/K t−2 -0.153 -0.200 -0.200 0.057 0.010 0.010
0.082 0.084 0.073 0.066 0.071 0.060
∆yt 0.204 0.179 0.179 0.152 0.150 0.149
0.089 0.089 0.081 0.050 0.051 0.044
∆yt−1 0.149 0.103 0.103 0.135 0.123 0.122
0.064 0.054 0.055 0.037 0.049 0.045
Ct/Kt−1 - 0.001 - - -0.003 -
0.218 0.109
Ct−1/Kt−2 - 0.290 0.290 - 0.146 0.147
0.142 0.103 0.095 0.100
(k-y)t−2 -0.187 -0.141 -0.142 -0.099 -0.085 -0.084
0.057 0.052 0.053 0.041 0.055 0.053
Sargan (p-value) 0.410 0.512 0.386 0.480 0.325 0.309
Cash Flow terms (p) - 0.019 0.005 - 0.288 0.139
LM (1) -3.937 -4.305 -4.289 -3.010 -3.171 -3.116
LM (2) -0.282 -0.035 -0.034 -1.150 -1.286 -1.242
Observations 588 588 588 666 666 666
Firms 199 199 199 209 209 209
NOTES:- Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients; estimation by
GMM-SYSTEM using DPD98 package one-step results; full set of time dummies included;
‘Sargan’ is a Sargan-Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported); ‘Cash
F l o wt e r m s ’i saW a l dT e s to ft h ej o i n ts i g n i ﬁcance of the two cash ﬂow terms (p-value re-
ported); ‘LM (k)’ is the test statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, distributed N(0,1) under the null; in columns (1) and (4) instruments
are yt−2 to yt−4 ,I t−2/Kt−3 to It−3/Kt−4, (k-y)t−2 to (k-y)t−3 in the diﬀerenced equations
and ∆It−1/Kt−2,∆2yt−1 in the levels equations; in columns (2),(3) ,(4) and (5) we also include
Ct−2/Kt−3 to Ct−3/Kt−4 in the diﬀerenced equations.
22Table 5: R&D Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆rt
UK Germany
∆rt−1 -0.178 -0.278 -0.107 -0.132
0.129 0.101 0.065 0.060
∆yt 0.627 0.382 0.486 0.424
0.214 0.240 0.169 0.186
∆yt−1 0.633 0.561 0.173 0.138
0.314 0.220 0.063 0.069
Ct/Kt−1 - 0.272 - 0.269
0.614 0.216
Ct−1/Kt−2 - 0.143 - -0.049
0.539 0.184
(r-y)t−2 -0.132 -0.159 -0.070 -0.064
0.054 0.044 0.047 0.039
Sargan (p) 0.44 0.865 0.82 0.827
Cash Flow terms (p) 0.347 0.210
LM (1) -2.52 -2.596 -3.70 -3.73
LM (2) -1.83 -2.396 0.550 0.500
Observations 389 389 666 666
Firms 159 159 209 209
NOTES:- Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported below the coeﬃcients; estima-
tion by GMM-SYSTEM using DPD98 package one-step results; full set of time dummies in-
cluded;‘Sargan’ is a Sargan-Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported);
‘Cash Flow terms’ is a Wald Test of the joint signiﬁcance of the two cash ﬂow terms (p-value
reported); ‘LM (k)’ is the test statistic for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals, distributed N(0,1) under the null; in column (1) instruments are yt−3
to yt−6 and rt−3 to rt−6 in the diﬀerenced equations and ∆yt−2 and ∆rt−2 in the levels equa-
tions; in column (2) we also include Ct−3/Kt−4 to Ct−6/Kt−7 in the diﬀerenced equations and
∆(Ct−2/Kt−3) in the levels equations; in column (3) we use yt−2 to yt−6 and rt−2 to rt−6, in
the diﬀerenced equations and ∆yt−1 and ∆rt−1 in the levels equations; in column (4) we also
include Ct−2/Kt−3 to Ct−6/Kt−7 in the diﬀerenced equations and ∆(Ct−1/Kt−2) in the levels
equations.
23We then consider adding cash ﬂo wt e r m st ot h i sb a s i cs p e c i ﬁcation. Notice that
our preferred measure of cash ﬂow for the R&D performing companies is cash ﬂow
net of R&D expenditures. We found this measure to be more informative about the
investment behaviour of British companies than cash ﬂow gross of R&D costs.20 As we
discuss further below, this is consistent with our view that most of the R&D budget is
regarded as a pre-committed expenditure, not sensitive to short run ﬂuctuations in the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position, rather than as a potential source of ﬁnance for ﬁxed investment.
Columns (2) and (5) then go on to include these cash ﬂow terms. A clear diﬀerence
emerges in these results insofar as the cash ﬂow terms are jointly signiﬁcant for Britain
but are insigniﬁcant at conventional levels for Germany (see the Wald test at the base
of the columns).21 Relaxing the constant returns to scale assumption by including an
additional term in the level of output was unnecessary as the variable was insigniﬁcant
(coeﬃcients (standard errors) on the second lag of output were 0.007(0.013)i nt h e
UK and 0.011(0.010) in Germany). Even in the more general non constant returns
models cash ﬂow was still an informative indicator for investment in UK ﬁrms, but not
in German ﬁrms. Finally we drop current cash ﬂow in columns (3) and (6). Again, the
cash ﬂow term is signiﬁcant at conventional levels only for the UK ﬁrms.
Turning to the R&D results contained in Table 5, the error correction terms are
again correctly signed, but determined with less precision in Germany than in the UK.
Another important diﬀerence is that unlike the ﬁxed investment equations cash ﬂow
is insigniﬁcant in both the British and German sample. Again, the results reported
here use cash ﬂow net of R&D costs. Similar results were found in the R&D equations
for cash ﬂow measured gross of R&D expenses22. A natural interpretation of this
20Neither measure was informative for German companies.
21This is consistent with the evidence presented in Bond et al (1997), using a smaller sample of
German ﬁrms that are quoted on the stock market (publicly traded Aktiengesellschaften).
22We were concerned that although adding R&D back into cash ﬂow (gross cash ﬂow) is more the-
oretically satisfactory it would generate a strong positive endogeneity bias as R&D would appear on
both left and right hand side of the estimated equation.
24is that transitory cash ﬂow movements are unlikely to have an important impact on
a ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures, which are largely committed someway in advance. The
diagnostics revealed evidence of more persistent serial correlation in the residuals in the
UK equations implying that it is necessary to use longer lags of the instruments than in
Table 4.23 This is why there are fewer observations for the UK sample in this table as
we lose one extra cross section of data. We experimented with including lagged R&D in
the investment equations and lagged investment in the R&D equations along the lines
of Lach and Schankerman (1989) but found these variables to be insigniﬁcant24.
These results are provocative but open to the criticism that we have focused only
on R&D performing ﬁrms. It seems likely that the R&D performers are a self selected
group whose behaviour may be systematically diﬀerent from other ﬁrms. To address this
issue we collected additional data on non-R&D companies in both countries. Comparing
these groups of ﬁrms is somewhat hazardous as many of the non-R&D ﬁrms are located
in low-tech industries where there is simply no opportunity for any ﬁrm to do R&D.
To avoid merely picking up diﬀerences in industrial structure, rather than diﬀerences
b e t w e e nR & Da n dn o n - R & Dﬁrms, we focus on ‘high tech’ industries deﬁned to be
those sectors with an above average ratio of R&D to sales.25 We re-estimated the ﬁxed
investment equations on this sample and the results are reported in Table 6 (since some
of these ﬁrms do no R&D we cannot, of course, estimate the R&D equations).
23If we ignore this misspeciﬁcation problem and use the invalid t-2 instruments, the cash ﬂow terms
become jointly signiﬁcant in the UK equation (χ
2(2) = 7.404) and the error correction term appears
to be insigniﬁcant (0.015 (0.043)). In Germany if we drop the t-2 instruments, cash ﬂow remains
insigniﬁcant (χ
2(2) = 1.387 with a p-value of 0.50).
24Other UK studies ﬁnd mixed results in this regard. Neither Toivanen and Stoneman (1998) or
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1996) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of ﬁrm level R&D eﬀects on investment as Lach
and Shankerman (1989) did. The former paper claims to identify some eﬀect of lagged investment on
R&D, however, and the latter paper produces evidence for the importance of industry level R&D on
ﬁrm level investment.
25Industries were chosen based on median R&D to sales intensity. The sample includes aircraft, chem-
icals, drugs, electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, vehicles, oﬃce and computing equipment,
transport equipment, peroleum reﬁneries and products, rubber and plastics, radio and TV equipment
and instruments.
25Again we observe that cash ﬂow is signiﬁcant in the UK investment equation (column
1), but not in the German investment equation (column 4). Column (2) then allows
the cash ﬂow eﬀect to be diﬀerent for the ﬁrms who perform any R&D compared to
the ﬁrms who do not (R&D=0). Interestingly, there appears to be evidence that cash
ﬂow has a greater impact on investment for the non-R&D performers than for the
R&D performers.26 Moving to a more parsimonious model in column (3) where we
drop some of the insigniﬁcant terms conﬁrms that this diﬀerence is indeed statistically
signiﬁcant. In Germany, by contrast, cash ﬂow remains insigniﬁcant for all samples that
we examine (although the sum of the point estimates on cash ﬂow are larger for the
non-R&D performers). The preferred model for Germany is that in column (6) where
the cash ﬂow terms are excluded altogether.27
Our interpretation of these results is that British ﬁrms are subject to signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial constraints whereas German ﬁrms appear not to be. Although clear from the
basic investment equations, this diﬀerence is not revealed in the R&D equations because
the main point at which ﬁnancial constraints bite is in the decision to engage in R&D,
rather than how much to spend in existing R&D programmes. The R&D performing
ﬁrms in the UK are a self selected group who choose to make long term commitments to
R&D programmes, partly on the basis that they do not expect to be seriously aﬀected
by ﬁnancial constraints - this is why cash ﬂow tends to matter less for these ﬁrms’
investment decisions than for other UK companies.
This interpretation is open to a large number of objections, which are addressed in
the next section.
26Notice that we do not include the R&D status interaction with cash ﬂow in the instrument set
because of the potential endogeneity of R&D status. The results are little changed, however, were we to
include it. For example, including the interaction term in column (3) leaves us with a linear cash ﬂow
coeﬃcient (standard error) of 0.245(0.102)a n da nac o e ﬃcient (standard error) on the interaction of
cash ﬂow and non-R&D status of 0.460(0.144).
27In Britain the Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the two terms in cash ﬂo wd r o p p e di nm o v i n g
from column (2) to column (3) is χ
2(2) = 0.906. In Germany the Wald test for all four cash ﬂow terms
dropped between columns (5) and (6) is χ
2(4) = 7.320 with an associated p-value of 0.12.
26Table 6: Fixed Investment Equations - R&D and non R&D Performers in
High Tech Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I t/Kt−1
UK Germany
I t−1/Kt−2 0.0002 -0.007 -0.037 0.072 0.068 0.092
0.070 0.054 0.067 0.072 0.071 0.046
∆yt 0.271 0.266 0.292 0.141 0.156 0.012
0.095 0.101 0.099 0.062 0.078 0.060
∆yt−1 0.031 0.049 0.054 0.108 0.114 0.086
0.088 0.086 0.093 0.054 0.057 0.024
Ct/Kt−1 0.311 0.079 - -0.231 -0.211 -
0.159 0.176 0.180 0.160
Ct−1/Kt−2 0.146 0.188 0.183 0.060 0.043 -
0.135 0.153 0.107 0.135 0.140
(R&D=0)*Ct/Kt−1 - 0.674 0.662 - -0.191 -
0.298 0.221 0.478
(R&D=0)*Ct−1/Kt−2 - -0.177 - - 0.347 -
0.340 0.564
(k-y)t−2 -0.072 -0.084 -0.089 -0.064 -0.066 -0.061
0.069 0.069 0.077 0.053 0.051 0.023
Sargan (p) 0.555 0.833 0.827 0.704 0.663 0.578
Cash Flow -linear (p) 0.002 0.170 0.087 0.214 0.306 -
Cash Flow -interaction (p) - 0.051 0.003 - 0.828 -
LM (1) -4.474 -4.678 -4.277 -4.715 -4.833 -4.017
LM (2) 0.576 0.996 0.665 -1.526 -1.569 -1.493
Observations 1107 1107 1107 800 800 800
Firms 263 263 263 246 246 246
NOTES:- Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported below coeﬃcients; UK results are
in columns (1) - (3), German results in columns (4) - (6); estimation by GMM-SYSTEM using
DPD98 package one-step results; full set of time dummies included; instrument set the same
as Table 4 columns (2) and (5) in columns (1) and (4) respectively. R&D=0 if ﬁrm does not
perform any R&D.
27Table 7: Horse Races - R&D Status vs. Size
It/Kt−1
UK Germany
I t−1/K t−2 -0.008 -0.004 0.085 0.073
0.077 0.071 0.080 0.071
∆yt 0.232 0.239 0.149 0.147
0.102 0.097 0.080 0.074
∆yt−1 0.025 0.014 0.100 0.112
0.080 0.087 0.059 0.054
(k-y)t−2 -0.056 -0.049 -0.049 -0.067
0.065 0.067 0.059 0.050
Ct/Kt−1 0.342 0.541 0.086 -0.251
0.231 0.254 0.437 0.398
Ct−1/Kt−2 0.252 0.246 0.505 0.401
0.148 0.163 0.423 0.315
(R&D=0)*(Ct/Kt−1) 0.678 - -0.583 -
0.357 0.790
(R&D=0)*(Ct−1/Kt−2) -0.082 - 0.148 -
0.370 0.717
(SMALL)*(Ct/Kt−1) -0.351 0.297 -0.239 0.093
0.279 0.269 0.452 0.321
(SMALL)*(Ct−1/Kt−2) 0.086 -0.107 -0.508 -0.426
0.189 0.186 0.445 0.366
Sargan (p-value) 0.873 0.552 0.625 0.559
SMALL interactions(p-value) 0.290 0.362 0.268 0.360
Cash Flow linear (p-value) 0.022 - 0.393 -
R&D=0 interactions (p-value) 0.084 - 0.687 -
LM (1) -4.424 -4.334 -4.714 -4.758
LM (2) 1.553 1.221 -1.515 -1.584
Observations 1107 1107 800 800
Firms 263 263 246 246
NOTES:- Same equation as Table 6 columns (2) and (5); SMALL =1 if the ﬁrm has below
median sample real sales. R&D=0 if ﬁrm does not perform any R&D.
285. Further Investigations
In this section we consider several challenges to the robustness and interpretation of our
results. In particular we investigate whether R&D status proxies for size diﬀerences;
whether R&D status is related to cash ﬂow; whether cash ﬂow is proxying for demand
expectations; evidence on the rate of return to R&D from production functions; and a
host of (mis) measurement issues.
5 . 1 . F i r mS i z ea n dC a s hF l o w
Does the R&D vs. non R&D sample split merely reﬂect diﬀerential ﬁrm size? R&D
performing ﬁrms were shown to be much larger than non-R&D performing ﬁrms in Sec-
tion 2, so the fact that cash ﬂow matters less for R&D performers could simply reﬂect
the fact that they are larger. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 mimic the most general
speciﬁcation of Table 6 but includes extra interactions with ﬁrm size. Small ﬁrms are
deﬁned as having real sales less the country-speciﬁc sample median. In both countries
there is no evidence that there is a signiﬁcantly positive interaction between cash ﬂow
and size. In Britain the interaction is insigniﬁcant and in Germany the interaction is
incorrectly signed (negative)28. These results are quite robust to dropping the interac-
tions with R&D status (see columns (2) and (4)), choosing other ways to deﬁne size
(such as initial employment) or including the size interactions in the instrument set. We
also tried including other interactions with R&D status to see if there were any other
systematic diﬀerences in the eﬀects of variables apart from cash ﬂow for the non-R&D
performers. All the other interactions were insigniﬁcant.29
28The negative sign on the interaction for Germany in quite surprising, although it should be remem-
bered that the ‘small’ ﬁrms in the data are not usually regarded as small by conventional standards.
From Table 2 we see that median ﬁrm size is well over 1000 employees for each country.
29For example, in the context of column (2) of Table 6, a Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of a full set
of interactions of the time dummies with R&D status (to check for diﬀerential response to the business
cycle) gave a Wald statistic of χ
2(7) = 9.711 with an associated p-value of 0.206. An interaction with
the error correction term and R&D=0 status had a coeﬃcient of -0.111 with a standard error of 0.073
295.2. Direct evidence from R&D status probits
An implication of our interpretation that cash ﬂow aﬀects the R&D participation equa-
tion rather than the R&D spending equation, is that a ﬁrm is more likely to set up
an R&D programme if it has (and expects to have) strong cash ﬂow. It is diﬃcult
to directly test this hypotheses as very few ﬁrms are observed to change R&D status
in our dataset. This is partially because we concentrate on large ﬁrms and partially
because transitions between R&D status come through company entry and exit which
we do not explicitly model.30 The infrequency of transitions from R&D to non-R&D
status is nevertheless consistent with our view that engaging in R&D implies a long
term commitment to ﬁnancing an inﬂexible R&D budget.
Table 8 oﬀers some evidence on this issue by reporting a probit model for R&D status
as a function of lagged cash ﬂow, lagged sales (to proxy size) and industry dummies.
In order not to inﬂate the precision of the estimates we do this for one cross section
in 1992 (where we have a large number of ﬁrms - similar patterns emerge taking other
years).
Firm size is correlated with a greater probability of conducting R&D in both coun-
tries, as one would expect. More importantly, lagged cash ﬂow is strongly and signif-
icantly correlated with whether a ﬁrm performs any R&D in Britain, but not in Ger-
many.31 In Britain it is also possible to include ﬁnancial structure variables available
on the balance sheet. The lagged ratio of debt to capital takes a signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient when added to the probit model for the UK (-1.548 with a standard error
of 0.514) but the cash ﬂow term remains signiﬁcantly positive (1.366 with a standard
error of 0.576).
These results are consistent with our view that UK ﬁrms that are more likely to
30We are implicitly assuming that the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects is suﬃcient to control for selectivity
problems.
31Evaluating the marginal eﬀect of cash ﬂow on R&D status at sample means reinforces this conclu-
sion.The marginal eﬀect in Britain is 0.404 and in Germany is 0.000008.
30be aﬀected by ﬁnancing constraints (i.e. those with low proﬁtability and/or high debt)
are less likely to participate in R&D. Of course, they may also reﬂect reverse causation,
with high proﬁtability being the result of successful R&D. But if this is the case it is
puzzling that a similar relationship is not observed in Germany.
Table 8: Probits for R&D Performance in high tech industries
R&D>0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
UK Germany UK UK
Ct−1/Kt−2 1.098 0.068 2.864 3.100
0.535 0.974 1.216 1.550
yt−1 0.477 3.853 0.272 0.277
0.178 1.119 0.183 0.186
(b V/ K)t−1 -0.056
0.226
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Log L -118.02 -77.18 -46.43 -46.39
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.223 0.230 0.230
Observations 212 218 94 94
Firms 212 218 94 94
NOTES:-The coeﬃcients and standard errors are taken from probit ML estimates of whether a ﬁrm
performed R&D in 1992. These are estimated for high R&D industries only. The ﬁnal two columns
conditions on the sample of ﬁrms where we also have analysts’ forecasts available to construct a predicted
Tobin’s Q (b V/ K).
5.3. Is Cash Flow proxying diﬀerential demand expectations?
A major problem with using cash ﬂow to proxy liquidity constraints is that the inter-
pretation of cash ﬂow is ambiguous. As we emphasized in Section 3.1 cash ﬂow could
be proxying expectations of future demand. We test the magnitude of this problem in
two distinct ways. First, following Bond and Cummins (2001) we construct a "pseudo
Q" measure of Tobin’s average Q based on analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. Bond
31and Cummins (2001) ﬁnd that when Q is speciﬁed in this way, it drives out current and
past cash ﬂow from investment equations. This is probably because the numerator of
Q appears to be much more informative about the fundamental value of the ﬁrm when
based on analysts forecasts than on noisily measured stock market prices.
Unfortunately, analysts’ forecasts are only available for about half of the ﬁrms in our
UK data (and not at all for Germany). Column (3) of Table 8 shows that the results hold
up on this smaller sample - cash ﬂow remains signiﬁcantly positively associated with
R&D performance. Column (4) includes the pseudo Q measure of future proﬁtability.
The point estimate is negative and insigniﬁcant and the cash ﬂow variable remains
signiﬁcant. We conclude that the cash ﬂow variable in not simply picking up diﬀerential
demand in the R&D participation equation.
The second method for looking at whether cash ﬂow simply proxies future demand
this is to examine forecasting equations for real sales (Table 9). Of particular interest
is the question whether cash ﬂow is a more informative predictor of future sales in the
UK than Germany. This would undermine our interpretation that the signiﬁcance of
the cash ﬂow terms in the UK investment equation (but not in the German investment
equation) reﬂects evidence for liquidity constraints in Britain.
The UK results are in Column (1) of Table 9 and should be compared with column
(3) which has the equivalent real sales equations for Germany. We estimate a VAR(2)
speciﬁcation using all the variables included in the investment models (we also estimated
VAR(1) and VAR(3) models with similar results). Although past cash ﬂow is positively
correlated with real sales, the cash ﬂow terms are not jointly signiﬁcant in the UK real
sales equation.32 In Germany, by contrast, cash ﬂow plays more of a role in predicting
future demand. This result ﬂatly contradicts the idea that the signiﬁcance of cash
ﬂow in the UK investment equation is picking up diﬀerential demand expectations.
32The other variables do a better job at forecasting future demand than cash ﬂow. For example, in
the UK the cash ﬂow terms become jointly signiﬁcant if we drop the lagged investment rates from the
sales regression (p-value 0.0004).
32Furthermore, the importance of cash ﬂow in Germany is somewhat reassuring. It could
be argued that the absence of cash ﬂow eﬀects in Germany is driven by attenuation bias
arising from greater measurement error in the German sample. If this was the case it
is unlikely that German cash ﬂow would do a good job of forecasting future demand.33
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 9 show the results for a more general model where
the coeﬃcients of the right hand side variables are allowed to vary by R&D status. The
idea here is to investigate whether the stronger cash ﬂow eﬀects in the UK non-R&D
s a m p l em a yb ed r i v e nb yt h ef a c tt h a tc a s hﬂow is more informative in predicting future
demand for ﬁrms who do not perform R&D. Again, in the UK the correlation is mildly
positive, but insigniﬁcant. In Germany the coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow are incorrectly
signed. Dropping all the interactions except the cash ﬂow interactions does not alter
the results - the cash ﬂow variables remain insigniﬁcant34.
We conclude that the results reported in the previous section cannot be explained
by systematic diﬀerences in the informativeness of cash ﬂow in forecasting future real
sales growth.
5.4. Evidence on rates of returns from Production Functions
One implication of our claim that British ﬁrms are subject to greater ﬁnancial con-
straints than German ﬁrms is that, at the margin, we might expect investment and
R & Dp r o j e c t st oe a r nah i g h e rr e t u r ni nB r i t a i nt h a ni nG e r m a n y . 35 An alternative ra-
33Related to this, we also considered simple reduced form models for investment, in which current
investment was related to its own lags and current and lagged cash ﬂow terms only (i.e. omitting all
sales terms from our preferred speciﬁcations). In this case we found positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects from
cash ﬂow in both countries.
34Although the theoretical model has expected sales as the main observable driving force of investment,
it may be that we are omitting determinants of future proﬁtable opportunities. In this sprit we also
replicated all speciﬁcations in Table 9 using cash ﬂow instead of sales as the dependent variable. Like
sales, lagged cash ﬂow is no better at predicting future cash ﬂow for non-R&D ﬁrms relative to R&D
ﬁrms in either country. Cash ﬂow signiﬁcantly predicts future cash ﬂow almost as well for Germany as
for the UK (sum of lagged coeﬃcients are 0.74 and 0.81 respectively).
35This would not necessarily follow if all R&D in Britain were performed by an unconstrained subset
of ﬁrms.
33tionalisation of the lower R&D intensities in Britain is that British R&D is simply less
productive than German R&D. To pursue this we estimated production functions for
Britain and Germany and calculated the implied marginal rates of return. Full results
are given in Bond, Harhoﬀ and Van Reenen (2003). Dynamic Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions were estimated for both countries. Real sales were allowed to depend on
capital, labor and R&D (following inter alia Griliches, 1986). The data and economet-
ric methodology are essentially identical to that utilized in this paper. We found that
we could always reject the hypothesis that Germany had a higher elasticity of output
with respect to R&D than the UK. Calculating the implied marginal rates of return
is extremely hazardous, especially across countries.36 Nevertheless, on the assumption
that depreciation rates and double counting problems are similar across countries, our
estimates of the gross excess rates of return to R&D were universally higher in Britain
than in Germany. This came from a combination of the fact that the estimated elas-
ticities of output with respect to R&D were higher in Britain (0.10 compared to 0.08
in our preferred models) and the fact that R&D intensity is lower in Britain than in
Germany. A similar pattern occurs for ﬁxed capital, the elasticities being 0.36 in the
U Ka n d0 . 3 0i nG e r m a n y . T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw ith investors requiring a higher hurdle
rate for an identical project in Britain relative to Germany, possibly as a result of a
higher cost premium for external sources of ﬁnance.
36See the discussions in Griliches and Mairesse (1983, 1990).
34Table 9: VAR Forecasting Equations for real sales in high R&D industries
UK GERMANY
yt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear Linear (R&D=0) Linear Linear R&D=0
interactions interactions
C t−1/K t−2 0.142 0.057 0.232 0.276 0.287 -0.016
0.088 0.098 0.172 0.104 0.115 0.274
Ct−2/K t−3 -0.079 -0.035 -0.133 -0.136 -0.089 -0.387
0.080 0.094 0.160 0.095 0.103 0.271
yt−1 1.039 1.041 -0.019 0.775 0.772 -0.032
0.047 0.069 0.088 0.073 0.078 0.172
yt−2 -0.047 -0.053 0.028 0.224 0.229 0.033
0.046 0.068 0.087 0.073 0.078 0.171
It−1/Kt−2 0.231 0.353 -0.239 0.433 0.387 0.255
0.088 0.068 0.166 0.133 0.155 0.258
It−2/Kt−3 -0.020 -0.042 0.057 -0.051 0.005 -0.230
0.050 0.059 0.098 0.112 0.124 0.269
R2 0.991 0.992 0.994 0.994
F-test of linear (C/K) terms 1.66(0.190) 0.20(0.821) 3.81(0.023) 4.17(0.016)
F-test of (C/K)*(R&D=0) - 1.15(0.317) - 2.36(0.095)
Observations 1107 1107 800 800
NOTES:- The sample is of ﬁrms in high tech industries (same as Table 6); all variables are in
levels; a full set of time and industry dummies in all columns; robust standard errors in italics;
estimation by OLS .
355.5. Other Measurement Issues
The main concern in this paper is not measurement error per se, but whether the
measurement diﬀerences between countries may be driving the results rather than any
intrinsic institutional diﬀerences. There is some further discussion of this in the Data
Appendix, but we list here a selection of the major robustness issues we considered.
(a) Pre sample information on investment. We use UK investment data from pre-
1985 to construct the capital stock whereas it is only available in Germany after 1986.
We re-constructed the capital stock measure in the UK to use only post-1985 informa-
tion. Similar results were found. For example, in the regressions of Table 6 column (1)
the Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the cash ﬂow terms was χ2(2) = 26.29.
(b) Deﬁnition of Investment. The UK investment data can be used to obtain sev-
eral measures of a wide (including acquisitions) or narrow (excluding acquisitions) in-
vestment series. All speciﬁcations were run on these diﬀerent measures with qualita-
tively similar results. For example, using the ‘narrow deﬁnition’ of investment and
capital which excludes ﬁxed assets purchased through acquisitions gave a coeﬃcient of
0.267(0.128)o nc a s hﬂow in the preferred model of investment for the R&D perform-
ers.37
(c) Accounting Change. There is a change in UK accounting procedures for the
sources and uses of funds account in 1991. Although we believe that a consistent
investment series before and after the change can be constructed, we checked this by
allowing all variables to take diﬀerent coeﬃcients before and after the change. All the
interactions were individually and jointly insigniﬁcant. For example, in column (2)
T a b l e4t h eW a l dt e s to ft h ej o i n ts i g n i ﬁcance of the interactions gave a χ2(6) =4 . 1 1
with an associated p-value of 0.662.
37This is the coeﬃcient on a model identical to that of Table 4 column (3) except we use contem-
poraneous cash ﬂow instead of lagged cash ﬂow only. This compares with 0.290(0.103)f o rt h e‘ w i d e ’
measure used elsewhere in this paper. So there is a slight diﬀerence in the preferred dynamic model
across the two deﬁnitions of capital.
36(d) German pensions funds. Unlike their British counterparts, it is not illegal for
German ﬁrms to draw on their internal pension fund reserves for investment purposes.
This could be considered as free cash ﬂow. We also experimented with several diﬀerent
ways of including the increase in pensions reserves in the deﬁnition of cash ﬂow for
Germany. None of these changed the qualitative nature of the results. For example,
replicating the regression in column (4) of Table 6 using the most inclusive deﬁnition
of cash ﬂow gave coeﬃcients (standard errors) on current and lagged cash ﬂow of -
0.192(0.126) and 0.091(0.100) respectively with a p-value on the Wald test of joint
signiﬁcance of 0.189.
(e) Consolidation of German accounts. In Germany a few of the companies we
analyze may be subsidiaries of larger groups whereas for the UK we only use the consol-
idated accounts of the parent company. This is only a problem for the sample underlying
T a b l e6w h e r ew ed r a wo nn o n - R & Dﬁrms. Although we never include more than one
subsidiary of a group in Germany we want to be sure that the results are robust to
the exclusion of these companies. In the event the qualitative results carry over to the
sub-sample, although with less precisely determined coeﬃcients (we know with certainty
that the accounts are worldwide consolidated for 80% of German ﬁrms). For example,
replicating the regression in column (4) of Table 6 gives coeﬃcients on current and
lagged cash ﬂow of -0.117(0.171) and 0.089(0.151) respectively with a p-value on the
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance of 0.752.
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined the cash ﬂow sensitivity of investment in both ﬁxed capital
and R&D, for samples of ﬁrms in Britain and Germany. We argued that the well
known institutional diﬀerences across the ﬁnancial systems in these two countries oﬀers
a powerful test for the importance of ﬁnancial constraints for investment in market
economies. Despite the common belief that ﬁnancial constraints cause British ﬁrms to
37invest less than their German counterparts, particularly in long-term investments like
R&D, there is almost no micro-econometric evidence in this area. We have assembled
data for essentially all the ﬁrms who report R&D in Britain and Germany since the
mid 1980s and test the hypothesis that British ﬁrms are more likely to face ﬁnancial
constraints than German ﬁrms.
Our results are easily summarised. Cash ﬂow matters for the ﬁxed investment of
British ﬁrms, but not German ﬁrms. In neither country does cash ﬂow appear to be
important for the ﬂow of R&D spending. In Britain cash ﬂow matters more for the
ﬁxed investment decisions of non-R&D ﬁr m st h a ni td o e sf o rR & Dﬁrms, and there is a
signiﬁcant correlation between cash ﬂow and whether or not a ﬁrm performs R&D. We
interpret this set of results as suggesting that UK ﬁrms face a higher wedge between
the costs of external and internal ﬁnance than German ﬁrms. Thus they are more
cautious about undertaking long term commitments to R&D projects than their German
counterparts, and those British ﬁrms that choose to do R&D are a self-selected sample
with ‘deep pockets’, for whom ﬁnancial constraints are less likely to be binding. Our
basic ﬁndings held up when subjected to a battery of robustness tests including explicit
estimation of forecasting equations for sales, R&D status equations (including analysts’
forecasts) and production functions.
There are of course numerous problems and criticisms still remaining. The macro-
economic turbulence induced by such events as German re-uniﬁcation in 1989 and
British exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 may make this
sample period unusual. From our perspective, these events provide a number of exoge-
nous shocks to the ﬁnancial position faced by our companies and are therefore a useful
source of exogenous variation. It may be, however, that future examination in more sta-
ble periods will reveal diﬀerent results. Another criticism is that the distinction between
‘German’ and ‘British’ ﬁrms is becoming meaningless in a world of increasingly global
ﬁnancial markets. However the systematic diﬀerences found here between superﬁcially
38similar large companies in the two countries suggest that national ﬁnancial systems
still matter when it comes to raising ﬁnance for long-term investment. Thirdly, our
results explain why fewer British ﬁrms perform R&D, but they do not explain why even
amongst the R&D performers there are such lower R&D intensities in Britain compared
to Germany. This could be linked to other problems such as diﬀerential skills and train-
ing patterns across the two countries. Examining diﬀerent R&D activities within ﬁrms
who operate R&D plants in both countries would be extremely useful in examining the
importance of these other factors
Finally, although we are conﬁdent that we have identiﬁed important diﬀerences
between the two countries, we are still faced with a serious challenge in explaining the
exact mechanisms that cause ﬁnancial constraints to be more signiﬁcant in the UK.
Edwards and Fischer (1994), among others, have cast doubt on the importance of long
term relationships between banks and ﬁrms in Germany. Other potentially important
diﬀerences relate to the proportion of companies whose shares are quoted (and actively
traded) on stock exchanges, the concentration of share ownership and the monitoring
role played (or not played) by institutional shareholders, the level and ﬂexibility of
dividend payout ratios, and the eﬀects of hostile takeover activity. Identifying which
(if any) of these factors are the root cause of diﬀerences in the impact of ﬁnancing
constraints on ﬁrms’ investment activities will be a priority in our future research.
39Appendix I: Data
1. Germany
The German dataset contains information on manufacturing ﬁrms from three ma-
jor sources: ﬁnancial accounts data (balance sheets and proﬁt and loss accounts) from
Hoppenstedt (commercial suppliers of databases) and Creditreform (a large credit rating
agency), and R&D expenditure data collected from the Bundesanzeiger, the oﬃcial bul-
letin of the German government. The data are available from 1987 onwards, since earlier
data are not directly comparable due to accounting regulatory changes. In 1985, several
changes were introduced into German corporate law (§289 Handelsgesetzbuch), most of
them triggered by the European Community’s Fourth Company Law directive on har-
monization of national requirements pertaining to ﬁnancial statements. Thus starting
in the ﬁscal year of 1987, all Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbHs, limited
liability corporations) and Aktiengesellschaften (AGs, stock-based corporations) had to
submit their annual ﬁnancial statements to the Commercial Register. Only the larger
ﬁrms have to have their statements audited, smaller ones need not submit a statement
of proﬁts and losses, and the balance sheet can be abbreviated signiﬁcantly. Medium-
sized and large ﬁrms are required to publish their statements in the Bundesanzeiger.
The size requirements are satisﬁed if two or more of the following conditions are met:
revenues in excess of DM 32 million, more than 250 employees, or balance-sheet total
in excess of DM 15 million.
A discussion of the situation of the business (Lagebericht) is part of the published
statement. Besides establishing new publication requirements, the 1985 law also requires
ﬁrms to comment on their R&D activities (§289 Handelsgesetzbuch, para 2).
The data used in this paper originate with ﬁnancial statements and respective ap-
pendices published in the Bundesanzeiger. To obtain the respective data, the 1993
40volume of the Bundesanzeiger was searched for any published statements that indicated
R&D activities. These roughly 900 records provided the “master list” of companies for
the data collection. The statements of these companies were then tracked backwards to
1987 and forward to 1994. Whenever companies provided quantitative items on their
R&D activities, the record was entered into the database. A list of companies which
had published similar information in 1987 was provided by B. Schwitalla and H. Grupp
and used to check the completeness of our own data search. See Schwitalla (1993) for a
description of the 1987 cross-section.
R&D Investment (R). Quantitative data on R&D activity were recorded from the
Bundesanzeiger if one or several of the following items were available: i) R&D expen-
ditures, ii) R&D employees, iii) R&D intensity with respect to sales, iv) R&D intensity
with respect to total number of employees, v) growth rates of any of these indicators.
For about 200 ﬁrms, comparable data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) were
available for two or more years. The R&D ﬁgures were nearly identical, leaving aside
rounding errors in the survey responses. Since the MIP survey explicitly asks for R&D
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eF r a s c a t id e ﬁnitions, the correspondence between the two sources is
reassuring.
Since the operationalisation of the theoretical model requires data on R&D expendi-
tures, the respective information had to be imputed for a small number of cases for which
it was not available directly. In the case of items ii) and iv), industry-speciﬁc regression
coeﬃcients from a previous analysis of the 1987 and 1989 Stifterverband surveys were
used to impute R&D expenditures from R&D personnel data. These regression results
are available upon request. As one should expect, the number of R&D employees and
R&D expenditures are highly correlated (r=0.98), and inclusion of time and industry
dummies in these regressions generates a good ﬁt.
In addition to the R&D items, the Bundesanzeiger statements were also used to col-
lect information on investment and capital stocks evaluated at historical costs. The data
41obtained from the Bundesanzeiger were then matched to commercially available balance
sheet data published by Creditreform, a large credit rating agency, or Hoppenstedt, a
supplier of commercial databases.
The latter two sources were also used to construct a large sample of ﬁrms satisfying
the publication requirements of the Handelsgesetzbuch, but without information on their
R&D activities. The information whether a ﬁrm from this group performs R&D or
not was obtained in telephone interviews with the respective ﬁr m s( u n l e s sm a t c h e d
Bundesanzeiger data clearly indicated that it was active in R&D). The telephone survey
asked ﬁrms whether they had a dedicated R&D laboratory within their enterprise. This
deﬁnition was chosen to be consistent with our presumption that setting up an R&D
laboratory may entail considerable costs. However, it proved infeasible to obtain detailed
R&D expenditure data for several years in these interviews.
Thus, these steps leave us with three groups of ﬁrms for which ﬁnancial accounts
data was available: R&D performers with R&D expenditures, R&D performers with
information on R&D expenditures missing, and ﬁrms which deﬁnitely did not perform
R&D. In order to have consistent samples when we estimate R&D investment equations
(for which R&D expenditure data are needed) and investment equations for R&D per-
formers and ﬁrms which do not undertake R&D, we only used the ﬁr s ta n dt h et h i r d
group of ﬁr m si nt h i sp a p e r .
Using ownership information from a variety of sources, all subsidiaries of foreign
ﬁrms were excluded. Similarly, we excluded all non-independent ﬁrms in order to avoid
measurement problems caused by transfer pricing etc. The following sections brieﬂy
describe the variables and their deﬁnitions.
Investment (I). The data on additions to plant, property and equipment came from
the detailed Anlagenspiegel tabulation of assets in each of the Bundesanzeiger entries.
The tabulation also includes their value at historical cost.
Capital stock (K) was computed by adjusting the historic cost values taken from
42the Anlagenspiegel for inﬂation, and by applying a perpetual inventory procedure with
a depreciation of 8 percent per annum for all years following the ﬁrst year for which
historic cost data were available.
PI














Kt : Capital Stock
PI
t : Price of Investment Goods
It : Real Investment
δ : Depreciation rate
The starting value was based on the net book value of tangible ﬁxed capital assets
in the ﬁrst observation within our sample period, adjusted for previous years inﬂation.
Subsequent values were obtained using accounts data on investment and disposals, na-
tional price indices for investment goods prices.
Output (Y). This is simply sales deﬂated by the aggregate GDP deﬂator.
Cash Flow (C). For the purpose of the regressions, cash ﬂow is computed as funds
available for investment net of R&D spending, i.e. as net income plus depreciation
(see the text for discussion of construction cash ﬂow gross of R&D spending). We
also experimented with measures of cash ﬂow which include the ﬁrms’ internal pension
schemes (see section 5.5).
2. Britain
The UK data is taken from the accounts of ﬁr m sl i s t e do nt h eU Ks t o c km a r k e t
whose main area of sales was in the manufacturing industries. This data is contained
in the Datastream on-line service.
R&D investment (R). During the 1980s political pressure built up to improve rates
of R&D disclosure as it did in Germany after the issuing of the European Community’s
Fourth Company Law directive . Changes began in 1985 in the Companies Consoli-
dated Act of that year, continued in 1987 with the publication of Exposure Draft 41
43committing the authorities to greater regulation and culminated in January 1989 in the
Standard Statement of Accounting Practice, SSAP (13) revised. This essentially made
reporting of R&D expenditures “highly recommended” (i.e. practically compulsory for
medium and larger ﬁrms deﬁned as having satisﬁed at least two out of the following
three criteria: more than 2,500 employees, turnover of at least £80m and balance sheet
total exceeding £39m). In the event, disclosure rates rose rapidly throughout the 1980s
in expectation of reform and many of the larger R&D performers had already been
disclosing38. The original SSAP (13) in 1977 required disclosure only of that portion of
R&D which is capitalised. The rules over capitalization are very strict and only a very
small fraction of ﬁrms capitalise any of their R&D. When they do it tends to be a very
small proportion of their R&D budget.
The R&D numbers we use are taken from the company accounts (consolidated group
total, DS119). When any R&D is capitalised that part of the capitalised R&D that is
was written oﬀ in that year is included in the R&D ﬂow measure. We also found our
numbers were consistent with the EXSTAT dataﬁle and the R&D Scoreboard (two other
commercial company-level databases).
investment (I). The basic variable used is total new ﬁxed assets. Unlike Germany
this includes not only plant, machinery and buildings but also acquisitions of other
companies. This is clearly very important in the UK where there are a large number of
takeovers and mergers. This was Item DS435 (= DS431+DS432) before 1992. After 1992
we took D1024 and positive values of DS479. Disposals are not included as the series
pre—1992 appears to be contaminated by measurement error. To check the robustness
of the results we experimented with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the investment series by
(a) including disposals and (b) using the narrower deﬁnition of investment to exclude
acquisitions. The results are robust to these diﬀerent deﬁnitions and the correlations
between the alternative investment series were very high (above 0.95).
38For an extensive discussion of the probability of disclosure attempt to deal with the selectivity issue
see Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998) or Belcher (1996).
44Capital stock (K) was computed in the same way as in Germany by adjusting the
historic cost values taken from the Datastream for inﬂation, and by applying a perpetual
inventory procedure with a depreciation of 8 percent per annum for all years following
the ﬁrst year for which historic cost data were available. When data was available we
used 1973 as the starting year.
Output (Y). Sales , Datastream Item 104 deﬂated by an aggregate producer price
index
Cash Flow (C). For the purpose of the regressions, cash ﬂow is computed as funds
available for investment, i.e. as net income plus depreciation.
3. Sample procedures for Both Countries
Only ﬁrms whose main activities where in manufacturing were kept. Non-proﬁt
ﬁrms and subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms were deleted as well. Firms engaged in large scale
merger or takeover activity were either split or dropped from the sample. The dataset
is trimmed so that observations were excluded if the following ratios were in the upper
or lower percentile of the respective distribution: (It/Kt−1),(Ct/Kt−1),(Yt/Kt−1).T h e
database still contains a small number of nonconsolidated statements for Germany , in
particular when comparability over time requires their use (see section 5.5).
Clearly these samples are not representative of the population of ﬁrms in either
country. They are representative of all the major R&D performers in each economy,
however, accounting for the vast bulk of all R&D performed. There is a spread of ﬁrms
across diﬀerent industries, although it can be seen from Table A2 that Germany has a
greater proportion of ﬁrms in the machinery sectors than the UK. Note that we have
used unbalanced panels (see Table A3) to mitigate survivor bias and the inclusion of
ﬁxed eﬀects in all the models should go some way to controlling for selectivity problems.
We use two extra years of data in the UK (1985 and 1986) than in Germany to keep
the sample sizes roughly comparable (there were fewer UK ﬁrms declaring R&D in the
1987-88 period than Germany before SSAP(13) took eﬀect).
45Table A1: Industry Breakdown: R&D Performers
UK GER UK GER
R&D/Y R&D/Y % in Sample % in Sample
Chemical & allied industries 3.3 6.6 16% 21%
Electrical engineering 5.4 7.8 19% 25%
Mechanical Engineering 4.0 5.6 21% 27%
Metals 0.4 2.9 2% 9%
Food, drink, tobacco 0.5 1.3 8% 2%
Other 1.2 4.4 34% 16%
Table A2: Industry Breakdown for R&D and Non-R&D Performers
%o fs a m p l e
Industry Code U.K Germany ‘R&D’ Industry?
Chemicals (inc. drugs) 3+5 10% 12% yes
Food, Drink, Tobacco 8 14% 15% no
Non-electical Machinery 12 8% 17% yes
Electrical Machinery 6 5% 12% yes
Textiles 24 11% 8% no
Paper and Printing 18 12% 3% no
Oﬃce Equipment (inc. computers) 15 7% 1% yes
Motor Vehicles 11 8% 5% yes
Metal Products 7 6% 5% yes
Others (none with >5%) 19% 22%
NOTES:-
Tables A1 and A2 are taken from the samples in 1992.
Firms classiﬁed by principal operating industry by sales.
46Table A3: Balance of Panel
R&D>0 High Tech Industries
No of years UK GER UK GER
34 0 2 5
43 9 2 8 3 3 4 1
56 8 3 7 5 4 3 9
62 7 5 5 2 9 4 6
7 9 46 27 57
8 6 43 18 63
933 3
10 7 69
Firms 199 209 263 246
Table A4 Distribution of observations over years
R&D>0 High Tech Industries
Year UK GER UK GER
1985 23 - 150 -
1986 29 - 164 -
1987 39 129 183 157
1988 44 138 205 175
1989 90 200 224 228
1990 145 214 233 247
1991 168 213 234 255
1992 175 200 225 244
1993 159 175 210 220
1994 114 99 143 129
Observations 986 1368 1971 1655
NOTES:- There are more observations here than in the regressions because some cross sections are lost
when using lags as right hand side variables and instruments
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